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Oregon's Procedural Due Process and the
Necessity of Judicial Review of Punitive
Damage Awards:
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg:
"Stop the insanity!"*
Gonna change my way of thinking. Make myself a

**
different set of rules.

I. INTRODUCTION

Just as it is against the law to falsely yell "Fire!" in a crowded theater,'
many corporate officers would no doubt like to see a law passed making it
a felony to yell "punitive damages!" in a crowded board room.2 When it
comes to feelings about punitive damages, there are not many fence-sitters-one either loves them3 or hates them; 4 one either believes punitive damage
* See Simi Horwitz, Susan Powter: Queen of the Infomercials. Don't Laugh--She's
Making Millions, WASH. POST, May 22, 1994, at Y07. This is the war whoop of fitness guru
and infomercial mogul, Susan Powter, familiar to insomniacs, graveyard shifters, and other
hapless viewers of predawn television. Though she has not spoken out on punitive damages,
the author would argue that Ms. Powter's trademark battle cry is nonetheless apropos to this
area of legal controversy.
** BOB DYLAN, Gonna Change My Way of Thinking, on SLOW TRAIN COMING
(Columbia Records 1979).
1. Schenck v. United States Baer, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
2. It is not simply the sheer pecuniary size of large punitive damage awards that
industry fears. Defendants also fear the stigma that may accompany punitive damage awards.
Jewell Hargleroad, Comment, Punitive Damages: The Burden of Proof Required By
ProceduralDue Process, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 99, 112-14 (1987). Defendants are aware that
a "plea for punitive damages essentially alleges that the defendant is a 'bad' or 'evil' person
or entity who deserves society's condemnation." Id. at 112.
3. For example, Brian O'Neil, an attorney representing the Alaskan fisherman facing
off against Exxon Corporation, proclaimed "We are ecstatic," following the five-billion-dollar
punitive damage award against Exxon. Natalie Phillips, Exxon Ordered to Pay $5 Billion
for Oil Spill, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1994, at A4. See also Stephen Daniels & Joanne
Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1990) (giving a
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awards are out of control5 or believes that these awards are accomplishing
worthy goals through worthy means. 6
Not surprisingly, punitive damages have historically been a source of
legal debate. 7 During recent years, this debate has become particularly
heated as big business8 has been reeling with increased frequency from the
one-two punch of enormous punitive damage awards. 9 In part, industry's
dread can be linked to a realization within the business world that much of
the control behind punitive damage awards, in terms of setting the amount
of the awards, has been relegated by states to juries.1 0 Additionally, big
businesses and smaller businesses" alike have been hit particularly hard
with large punitive damage awards, in part, so it seems, due to their status
as "deep pocket" defendants.' 2 Foreign businesses, in particular, have
come to fear litigation in the United States, because these businesses
believe
3
that they will fall prey to jury bias and prejudice against them.'
succinct overview of anti-reform arguments for the continued use of punitive damages).
4. Following the jury verdict in the Exxon Valdez oil spill case, and responding to
the size of the punitive damage award, Patrick Lynch, an Exxon attorney, stated, "I think it
is a case of the jury not appreciating what $5 billion means." Natalie Phillips, Exxon
Ordered to Pay $5 Billion for Oil Spill, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1994, at A4. The response
of Lee R. Raymond, Exxon Chairman, to the award, was simply, "We will use every legal
means available to overturn this unjust verdict ... ." Id.
5. See Daniels, supra note 3, at 10-11.
6. See, e.g., Id. at 14 (arguing that punitive damage awards have fallen victim to
"horror stories and anecdotes about jury verdicts involving punitive damages.").
7. The Supreme Court, Leading Cases., 107 HARV. L. REV. 145, 185-94 (1992).
8. See Robert Pear, Big Firms Could Bypass Clinton's Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 1993, at 1E (defining "big businesses" as companies with 1,000 or more employees).
9. See Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d 329, 347 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) ($10
million award); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319 S.E.2d 470, 481 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)
($8 million award); Palmer v. A. H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 221 (Colo. 1984) ($6.2
million award).
10. Perhaps this can partly explain the rise in recent years of the jury selection
industry, in which attorneys enlist the aid of professionals whose sole task is to aid the
attorneys in selecting a jury that is likely to reach the desired verdict and the desired amount
of damages.

See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN

COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (1977).

11. See Kathleen Day, The Reformer Meets the Restaurateurs: Small-Business Group
Warns Bentsen of Job Losses if Health Coverage Plan Passes, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1993,
at Cl (defining "small businesses" as firms with from 100 workers to those firms with 500
or more workers).
12. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other
Personal Injuries Created Equal?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 5, 6 (Winter and Spring

1991).

13. See Jack L. Lahr, Bias and Prejudice Against Foreign Corporations in Patent and
Other Technology Jury Trials, 2 FED. CIR. B. ASS'N 405, 405 (1992). Lahr maintains that
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On the other hand, some commentators take the position that the socalled punitive damage plague is little more than an illusion and the result
of a well-organized, well financed campaign of hyperbole.' 4 According to
this viewpoint, punitive damages have deliberately been given a "bad rap,"
so that those interest groups seeking to reform the punitive damage system
can better achieve their goal of bettering themselves.15 Further, the most
effective way in which these "reformists" can better themselves is to lobby
to alter the system of punitive damages, or, better still, to abolish it
completely. 6 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Honda Motor Co.
v. Oberg17 lends additional weight to the reformist side of the punitive
damage debate.
Regardless of which side of the punitive damage debate is more
accurate, the Supreme Court has not been entirely deaf to the reformists'
cries of foul.' 8 In recent years, the Court has by fits and starts begun the
process of tightening the reins on the circumstances in which punitive
damages may be awarded as well as the amount of the punitive damage
awards. 9 In 1991, for example, in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,20
the Court for the first time examined punitive damage awards in relation to
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 21 The Haslip Court held
that punitive damage awards must be examined so as to ensure that the
award is reasonable and to ensure that the lower court gave the jury
adequate guidance.22 Two years later, in TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp.,23 the Court reaffirmed the rationale behind its Haslip
decision. In TXO, the Court refused to serve up a "bright line" test to
"[clorporations from Asian-Rim countries, notably Japan, involved as defendants ... express
particular concern about the susceptibility of the U.S. jury system to ... prejudice." Id.
14. See Daniels supra note 3, at 10-11.
15. Id. at 10.
16. Id. at 10.
17. 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
18. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). In Haslip,
Justice Blackmun expressed concern about punitive damages which "run wild." Id. at 18.
19. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993); Haslip, 499 U.S. 1; Browning-Ferris
Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v.
Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoic, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
20. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
21. R. McKenna Richards, Jr., Note, Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip: Punitive
Damagesand the Modern Meaning of ProceduralDue Process,70 N.C. L. REV. 1362, 1382

(1992).

22. Id. at 18.
23. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
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determine whether a punitive damage award violated due process, but
instead, based its analysis upon general concerns of reasonableness.24
The most recent instance in which the Court elected to grapple with the
punitive damage quandary was the case of Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,'5
which originated in Oregon.26 Honda gave the Supreme Court another
opportunity to clarify the limits which the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause27 places upon punitive damage awards. 2' Given the
Court's strong praise for the procedural practices in Haslip and TXO, which
exemplified the ideals of procedural due process, 29 the Court's strong
stance on procedural due process in Honda was not particularly surprising.
However, this by no means diminishes the significance of the Court's
Honda decision, nor the ramifications of this decision on future punitive
damage awards throughout the nation.
While at the time of the Honda decision, Oregon was the only state
which did not provide for judicial review of punitive damages awards,3 °
other states will certainly be affected by this decision. The Court's stance
in Honda has effectively put other states on notice that their procedures for
awarding punitive damages will be closely examined. Unfortunately, while
the Court's Honda decision has helped, if only in a small way, to control socalled runaway punitive damage awards, the decision has left unanswered
the question of what form of judicial review is necessary to meet the
demands of the Due Process Clause.3
This note will show that judicial review of punitive damage awards is
a necessary safeguard in protecting against the abuse of punitive damage
awards. Section two of this note discusses the history of punitive damages
and the role they have played in American jurisprudence. Section three sets

24. Id. at 2719-20. Here the Court noted that the jury was "impartial," the damages
were based on "collective deliberation," the award was reviewed and affirmed by a judge
who was privy to the testimony, and the State Court of Appeals had affirmed the decision.
Id.
25. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
26. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 851 P.2d 1084 (Or. 1993).
27. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
states, in part, "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ......
28. Court Accepts Oregon Case on Jury Awards, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 15, 1994, at A4.
29. See id. at 2723. The Court noted that the trial judge and appellate judges gave
adequate review of the punitive damage award. Id.
30. Id. at 2338.
31. Robert B. Rocklin & Stephen L. Madkour, Supreme Court Review: Winners in
Oregon Fare Poorly in D.C., OR. ST. B. BULL. Aug.-Sept. 1994, at 13.
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out the facts of Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg.32 Section four is divided into
a three-part analysis of Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg. Part one of section four
explains where Honda is situated within the context of the punitive damage
debate. Part two of section four sets out the important role which judicial
review plays whenever a jury awards punitive damages. Part three of
section four argues that the Supreme Court's Honda decision reinforces the
necessity of judicial involvement in the punitive damage arena and
concludes that the decision will help to slow the unsettling explosion of
punitive damage awards.
H. THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Punitive damages are not the new kid on the legal chopping block.33
In fact, punitive damages have been around for over two hundred years.34
The general consensus among commentators is that two eighteenth century
English cases, Huckle v. Money 35 and Wilkes v. Woods, 36 were the first
actions to utilize and articulate punitive damages in the way in which they
have become most familiar today.37 Apparently during an unlawful search
of Wilkes' home, agents of the King, in a quest for machinery- allegedly
used to print unsavory descriptions of the Sovereign, mistakenly arrested
Huckle.3 s As a result of the unlawful actions of the King's agents, Wilkes
and Huckle each received damage awards exceeding the amount of their
actual damages.39

32. Id.
33. The proliferation of law review articles and news headlines, however, which focus
on punitive damages might lead one to believe otherwise. See, e.g., Stephan Chapman, Odor
in the Court: The Great Lawsuit Lottery and How to Close It Down, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29,
1995, § 4, at 3 (comparing Alabama's damage award system to a lottery).
34. See, e.g., Linda J. Guss, Comment, Punitive Damages Under Uninsured Motorist
Coverage--Oregon's Probable Approach, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 933, 938-40 (1988)
(offering a thumbnail discussion of the origins and uses of punitive damages).
35. 2 Wils. K. B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763).
36. 2 Wils. K. B. 203, 95 Eng. Rep. 766 (1763).
37. Guss, supra note 34, at 938.
38. Woods, 2 Wils. K. B. 203.
39. Guss, supra note 34, at 938. Wilkes brought an action for trespass, and Huckle
sought damages for trespass and false imprisonment. Id. Oddly enough, not only was
Huckle left, by and large, unscathed by the event, fed "beefsteake and beer" and treated well
during his brief imprisonment, he was awarded "300 pounds in damages, which was nearly
300 times his weekly wages." Id. at 938 n.32 (quoting Brogdon, Insuring Punitive Damages:
A Closer Look at Public Policy Analysis, FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. at 369-70 (Summer
1987)).
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Similarly, the history of punitive damages in the United States extends
back to the nation's earliest days.40 By the mid-nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that punitive damages were a solid component
of common law. 4' These early cases demonstrate that the American legal
system adopted the English practice of awarding punitive damages,42 and
likewise adopted the English (and ancient) rationale4 3 for awarding this
peculiar type of damage award; namely, to "punish and deter wrongdoers for
outrageous conduct.""4
Punitive damages today are typically based upon a defendant's behavior
which can be classified as either malicious, willful, wanton, oppressive, or
outrageous. 45 The traditional rationale for assessing punitive damages is

40. See Daniels, supra note 3, at 7. Daniels refers to Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1791), as the first punitive damages case. Colbaugh was an action brought for
breach of contract to marry. 'The court instructed the jury "to give damages for examples
sake, to prevent such offenses in [the] future." Id. (quoting Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. at 91).
Other commentators, however, have cited Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.)
363 (1851), as the first official punitive damages case in the United States. See, e.g., Guss,
supra note 34, at 939 n.33. Oddly enough, Day was also a breach of contract to marry case.
54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
Still another case, Genay v. Norris, I S.C. 3 (1784), is cited as "[o]ne of the earliest
cases to report punitive damages in the United States." Michael J.Pepek, Note, TXO v.
Alliance: Due Process Limits and Introducing a Defendant's Wealth When Determining
Punitive Damages Awards, 25 PAC. L.J. 1191, 1197 (1994). In Genay, a doctor drugged
Genay's wine as a practical joke, causing him to become sick. Genay, 1 S.C. at 3. Genay
was not amused and brought an action against the doctor, for which the jury awarded Genay
punitive damages. Id. The Genay court approved of the damages due to the wanton and
outrageous conduct of the good doctor. Id.
Arguably, either of these cases, and doubtless others, could be considered the "first"
punitive damage case in the United States, depending upon one's criterion for defining a
"punitive damage" case. Nonetheless, whichever of these cases you would like to label as
the first punitive damages case, punitive damages have been here for some time and are, by
now, firmly embedded (or entrenched) in our legal system. In fact, Dean Prosser argued that
punitive damages "are an established part of our legal system, and there is-no indication of
any present desire or tendency to abandon them." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 2, at 11 (4th ed. 1971).
41. Pepek, supra note 40, at 1199. In Day v. Woodworth, the Court held that the
amount of exemplary damages was to be based upon the size of the defendant's offense and
not merely set so as to compensate the plaintiff. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
42. Pepek, supra note 40, at 1197-98.
43. Id. at 1192. Legal historians have traced the origin of punitive damages to
approximately 2,000 B.C., where, in Babylon, punitive damages (or, as they were
conceptualized as that time, "multiple damages") were included in the Code of Hammurabi.
Id. at 1194.
44. Id. at 1193.
45. Daniels, supra note 3, at 7 (giving a sweeping overview of the historical use of
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that the award of punitive damages will not only punish wrongful behavior,' but will also serve as a deterrent to other would-be wrong-doers.47
Punitive damages are sometimes called exemplary damages,48 in that they
serve to set an example of what sort of activities and behavior society will
not accept. 49 One commentator has listed seven distinct punitive damage
objectives: (1) punishment of the defendant;5" (2) deterrence so as to
prevent the defendant from repeating wrongful behavior;5 ' (3) deterrence
so as to prevent other potential wrong-doers from committing wrongful
acts; 52 (4) maintenance of peaceful relations; 53 (5) inducement for private
law enforcement;' (6) compensation for victims for losses that cannot be
compensated by other means; and (7) payment of the plaintiffs attorney's
fees."
Just as punitive damage awards are not a recent phenomenon to the
United States, 5 6 animosity towards these punitive damages is likewise not
solely a product of our times.57 Over a hundred years ago, in Fay v.
58 Justice Foster
Parker,
delivered a particularly scathing diatribe against
punitive damages, 59 labeling them a "monstrous heresy . . . and [an]

punitive damages and the current debate that such awards have fostered).
46. Colbern C. Stuart III, Note, Mean, Stupid Defendants Jarring Our Constitutional
Sensibilities: Process Limits on Punitive Damages After TXO Prod. v. Alliance Resources,
30 CAL. W. L. REv. 313, 315 (1994). Stuart calls this justification for punitive damage
awards the "retributionist" rationale. Id.
47. Id. Stuart describes this as the "consequentialist" rationale for punitive damage
awards which is particularly effective in its focus on the "bean counter" mind-set of those
who are more likely to be dissuaded from engaging in wrongful conduct when their wallets
may be damaged by doing so. Id. at 315-16.
48. See, e.g., Scott A. Hennis, Note, Exemplary Damages--SurvivalStatute--Recovery
of Exemplary Damages From The Estate of a Tortfeasor is Permitted Under the Texas
Survival Statute, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 731, 732 (1985) (indicating that punitive damages are
also called "vindictive," "smart money," and "presumptive damages").
49. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 6 n.1 (1991).
50. Daniels, supra note 3, at 7.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Daniels, supra note 3, at 7.
56. See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text (discussing the secure place of
punitive damages throughout legal history).
57. Guss, supra note 34, at 939.
58. 53 N.H. 342 (1873).
59. Id. at 382.
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unsightly' and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry and body of
the law." 0
Of course, the use of punitive damages has its proponents. 6' Some
commentators have focused, inter alia, upon the safer products that are
placed into the market stream as a result of punitive damage awards.6 2
Here the argument is that if the costs of producing and introducing a
dangerous product into the consumer market outweigh the profitability of
marketing the product, a manufacturer will replace a dangerous product with
a safer product.63
Nonetheless, uneasiness, if not downright ill-will, toward punitive
damage awards has carried over to modem times.' Commentators have
argued that punitive damages merely offer a windfall for plaintiffs,6 5 that
punitive damages fail in the goal of achieving bona fide deterrence,66 and,
perhaps most significantly, that punitive damages can violate constitutional
rights.67
This generalized disdain for punitive damages has meandered somewhat
haphazardly through the court system during the past ten years. 68 During
60. Id.

61. See, e.g., Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of
Punitive DamageAwards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REV. 61, 74 (1992); see also
Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True
Purpose Of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 474, 476 (1993).
62. See, e.g., Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability:
Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1992).
63. Id. at 16.
64. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 3, at 6-8; Pepek, supra note 40, at 1198-99.
65. See James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Coles, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic that has
Outlived its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1165 (1984).
66. Daniels, supra note 3, at 8. "
67. 1 LINDA L. SCHLUTER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 3-3.13,
at 45-70 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing various constitutional challenges to punitive damages,
including violations of substantive due process, Id. at § 3.3, at 40; civil procedural due
process challenges, Id. at § 3.4, at 41; First Amendment challenges, Id. at § 3.5, at 45;
Confrontation Clause challenges, Id. at § 3.7, at 52; Self-incrimination Clause challenges, Id.
at § 3.8, at 53; Double Jeopardy challenges, Id. at § 3.9, at 53; Eighth Amendment challenges, Id. at § 3.10, at 56; and plaintiff constitutional attacks on punitive damage limitations, Id.
at § 3.12, at 61).
68. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989);
Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoic, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court' set the standard for due process review of punitive
damages as early as 1908. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73 (1907).
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this time, courts have struggled to come to terms with both punitive damage
awards that have grown alarmingly large69 and with constitutional challenges that have left us--at least until recently--without a clear picture of the
limits the Constitution places upon the implementation of punitive damage
remedies.70 Some of these punitive damage award challenges have been
deemed of sufficient import to warrant review by the United States Supreme
Court.7 1 An examination of these decisions indicates that the Court, while
hesitant to wade too deeply into the punitive damage quagmire, has
nonetheless been moved by the cries of outrage to begin to set reasonable
boundaries within which punitive damages may be awarded.
Many defendants faced with the unenviable dilemma of paying large
punitive damage awards have argued that the awards violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.72 Due Process Clause challenges

In Seegers, the Court held that if a damage award "amount[s] to a deprivation of property
without due process of law," it is excessive. Id. at 76-77.
69. See Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d 329, 347 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (ten
million dollars); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319 S.E.2d 470, 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(eight million dollars); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 221 (Colo. 1984) (over six
million dollars).
70. See, e.g., Paul Barrett, High Court Vagueness on Punitive Damages Leads to Legal
Chaos, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1993, at Al (arguing that chaos ensues when state courts
cannot decipher cryptic Supreme Court punitive damage decisions). See also Debra Cassens
Moss, The Punitive Thunderbolt, 79 A.B.A. J. , May 1993, at 88 (discussing how lower court
decisions reflect a generalized confusion regarding punitive damage awards after the Haslip
decision). See generally William H. Volz & Michael C. Fayz, Punitive Damages and the
Due Process Clause: The Search for Constitutional Standards, 69 U. DET. L. REV. 459
(1992) (discussing how recently the Supreme Court has agreed that there are due process
limits to punitive damage awards but that individual members of the Court have not agreed
as to the nature of these limits).
71. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co., v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989);
Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoic, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1984).
72. See St. Louis Iron Mt. & So. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919); Bankers
Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435
(1989); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg., 114 S. Ct. 2331
(1994).
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74
can focus on either procedural due process," substantive due process,
or both.
For nearly a decade, the Supreme Court has expressed its willingness
to at least examine the possibility of setting limits on punitive damage
awards based on due process challenges. 75 However, the Court has been
reluctant to explore the matter in depth when such discussion would
inevitably be labeled dicta. 6 In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie," the
appellant contended that a punitive damage award violated not only the
excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment 78 but also the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 79 Even though the Court based its
decision on another ground,80 it indicated that the appellant's "arguments
raise important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved.
181

Similarly, in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,82 the Court
let pass an opportunity to discuss punitive damages limits because the
petitioner had failed to raise the issue below.83 Nonetheless, Justice
O'Connor, in her dissenting opinion,8 indicated that the petitioner's due

73. Procedural due process refers to "procedures used by the government to deprive
persons of life, liberty, or property, not the substantive reasonableness of such restrictions."
Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 625,
625 (1992).
74. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897). Substantive due process
mandates that deprivations of life, liberty, or property be reasonable. Id.
75. See Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 86-89 (O'Connor,

J., concurring). See generally RICHARD BLATr ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BYSTATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE (1991).

76. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
77. Id.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The excessive fines clause states that "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." Id.
79. See supra text accompanying note 21.
80. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 828-29. In Lavoie, an insurance company was ordered to pay
a $3,500,000 punitive damage award for its "bad faith" in failing to pay an insurance claim.
Id. at 816. The insurance company, however, contended that the punitive damage award
violated its due process rights. Id. at 820. The Court failed to discuss the due process issues
raised by the $3,500,000 punitive damage award, and instead, held that the insurance
company's due process rights had been violated because the state supreme court judge who
affirmed the decision may have been biased against the insurance company. Id. at 825.
81. Id. at 828-29.
82. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
83. Id. at 78-79.
dissenting).
84. Id. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J.,
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process argument might have made the grade had the Court addressed the
matter.8 5
Likewise, in Browning-Ferris Indust. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 6 the
Court refused to address the due process argument of excessive punitive
87
damages because the petitioner had failed to raise the issue below.
However, in this case, the entire Court, seemingly moved by Justice
O'Connor's dissenting position in Bankers Life & Casualty, would have
been willing to address the due process challenge had the case been
The Court acknowledged that its previous decisions
appropriate.88
indicated that the "Due Process Clause places outer limits on the size of a
civil damages award . . .but we have never addressed . . .whether due
process acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award punitive
damages."8 9 Then, with characteristic reluctance, the Court stated that the
"inquiry must await another day," because the petitioner failed to raise the
issue below .'
Two years later, in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,9' the Court
followed through on its earlier interest in addressing the punitive damage
issue. 92 In Haslip, the plaintiffs were victimized by an insurance agent
who had failed to turn in the plaintiffs' insurance premium payments to the
insurance company.9 a As a result of the agent's misappropriation of the
plaintiffs' funds, Haslip found that after she had been hospitalized, she could

85. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that "the Court should scrutinize carefully the
procedures under which punitive damages are awarded in civil lawsuits." Id.
86. Browning-Ferris Indust. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
87. Id. at 276-77.
88. Kelco, 492 U.S. at 276-77.

89. Id.

90. Id.
91. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
dissenting) (arguing that punitive damages as they relate
92. Id. at 18 (O'Connor, J.,
to due process issues would be a worthy topic given appropriate circumstances).
93. Id. at 4-5. Haslip and other employees of Roosevelt City, an Alabama municipality,
participated in a health insurance plan which Lemmie L. Ruffin, an insurance agent, had
solicited to the municipality. Id. at 4. Ruffin forwarded the first premium payments along
with the insurance applications to the insurers. Id. at 5. Subsequently, an arrangement was
set up wherein the premium payments would be deducted from the employees' monthly pay
and sent to or picked up by Ruffin. Id. However, instead of forwarding premium payments
to the insurers, Ruffin misappropriated most of the payments. Id. When the insurer did not
receive payment, it sent notices indicating that health coverage had lapsed to Ruffin and a
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company agent. Id. However, these notices were not
forwarded to Haslip and the other Roosevelt City employees. Id. Thus, it was not until
Haslip needed to utilize her health insurance that she discovered that she was not insured.
Id. at 5-6.
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not recover payment on her policy.94 Haslip's physician contacted a
collection agency, and, as a result, Haslip's credit rating was damaged. 9
The plaintiffs then instituted a lawsuit against Pacific Mutual Insurance
Company."
The jury awarded Haslip approximately $200,000 in compensatory
damages and $840,000 in punitive damages. 97 In his majority opinion,
Justice Blackmun stated that because punitive damages were a firmly
established part of legal history, the Court could not say "that the common
law method of assessing punitive damages is so inherently unfair as to deny
due process and be per se unconstitutional. 9 8 On the other hand, the
Court stated that "unlimited jury discretion--or unlimited judicial discretion
for that matter--in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results
that jar one's constitutional sensibilities." 99 Even so, the Court declined to
draw what it termed a "mathematical bright line' ° with which to separate
the constitutional from unconstitutional uses of punitive damages.'"
Instead, the Court elected to assess the constitutionality of the punitive
" '0' as well as the amount of
damage award in terms of "reasonableness,
"guidance" given by the court to the jury. 0 3
With these criteria in mind, the Court upheld the punitive damage
award in Haslip.' 4 In so doing, the Court noted that while the jury
instructions used in Haslip'05 gave the jury a wide berth, nevertheless, the
jury's discretion was not "unlimited,"'" as the jury was admonished to

94. Id. at 5.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 6 (1991).
98. Id. at 17.
99. Id. at 18.
100. Id.
101. Id. The Court acknowledged that punitive damages have historically been
recognized as a viable and constitutionally sound method to achieve the goals of punishment,
deterrence, and even compensation. Id. at 15. However, the Court cautioned that even these
worthy goals cannot be achieved through punitive awards that are unconstitutional precisely
because they have been allowed to "run wild." Id. at 18.
102. Id.
103. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
104. Id. at 23-24. Justice O'Connor, in her lone dissent, indicated that the use of
punitive damage awards warranted a higher level of procedural due process. Id. at 42-43
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor was particularly concerned that punitive
damages may be employed so as "to target unpopular defendants, penalize unorthodox or
controversial views, and redistribute wealth." Id. at 43.
105. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19.
106. Id. at 19.
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consider "the character and the degree of the wrong."' 0 7 The Court also
found that the judicial review of the punitive damage award helped to ensure
that the award was "not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
offense ..
,108
Two years later, the Court took another joust at the punitive damage
dragon in TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.'" In this case,
TXO, in an action brought against it for slander of title,110 was ordered to
pay Alliance nineteen thousand dollars in compensatory damages and ten
million dollars in punitive damages."' The plaintiff introduced evidence
to the jury that TXO had acted in bad faith." 2 Additionally, the plaintiff
gave the jury information regarding TXO's financial condition," 3 specifi-4
cally, that TXO. stood to profit mightily from its actions in bad faith,"
and that TXO had profited in the past from similar acts of bad faith." 5
TXO appealed the verdict, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
award violated the Fourteenth Amendmedetermine if the punitive damage
6
Clause."
Process
Due
nt's

107. Id.
108. Id. at 22.
109. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
110. Id. at 2716. In 1984, TXO geologists discovered that large profits could be reaped
by extracting oil and gas deposits from beneath the surface of a tract of land controlled by
Alliance. Id. at 2715. TXO then offered Alliance $20 per acre in cash and an additional
22% of oil and gas revenues earned from the property, as well as offering to pay for the
development costs. Id. Alliance accepted the offer and agreed to return the consideration
it received from Alliance should TXO's attorney determine that the title to the property
which Alliance conveyed to TXO was bad. Id. Subsequently, TXO discovered a means by
which to possibly convince Alliance that the title Alliance had conveyed was likely to fail,
although TXO knew that, in fact, the title was sound. Id. To carry out its ruse, TXO tried
unsuccessfully to convince previous parties who had an interest in the property that oil and
gas rights had not been properly conveyed to Alliance. Id. Nonetheless, TXO paid six
thousand dollars to Virginia Crews, one of the parties with a prior interest in the property,
to convey to TXO a quitclaim deed in the property. Id. TXO recorded the deed and
informed Alliance that there was a problem with the title. Id. at 2715-16. However,
Alliance refused to renegotiate the royalty arrangement, and TXO brought an action against
Alliance. Id. Alliance subsequently counterclaimed against TXO, alleging slander of title.
Id.
111. Id. at 2717.
112. Id. at 2716. The evidence indicated that when TXO had tried to renegotiate its
royalty set-up based on an allegedly worthless quitclaim deed, TXO was aware that Alliance,
in fact, had good title to the oil and gas. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2716-17.
116. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2714 (1993).

NORTHERN ILNOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15

In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens upheld the punitive damage
award against TXO." 7 Justice Stevens reasoned that because of the
myriad factors a jury may take into account when awarding punitive
damages, it was not appropriate to set out a list of objective criteria against
which to assess the constitutionality of that award." 8 However, Justice
Stevens noted that certain objective criteria may be used as a part of the
punitive damage review analysis." 9 With this in mind, and in a manner
which mirrored the reasonableness standard set out in Haslip,2 ° the Court
examined the punitive damage award to determine if it was "so 'grossly
excessive'" as to violate the Due Process Clause."' 22 The Court found
that the punitive damage award was reasonable.'23
Thus, because the Court's TXO decision appeared to do little more than
reaffirm the generic reasonableness principles asserted two years earlier in
Haslip, state courts were left somewhat floundering. Following Haslip and
TXO, state courts knew that the Constitution imposed reasonableness limits
on punitive damage awards, but what "reasonableness" itself might mean
was still a bit foggy, to say the least.'24 The Court's 1994 decision in
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg25 seemed to help lift some of that fog.' 26
While the Honda decision failed to produce a "bright line" constitutionality
117. Id. at 2724.
118. Id. at 2720. Justice O'Connor, however, in her dissent, chided the majority for not
providing some form of objective instructions for the evaluation of punitive damage awards.
Id. at 2731-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Such objective criteria, Justice O'Connor asserted,
would help to eliminate "that element of subjectivity" which might otherwise contaminate
an assessment of a punitive damage award. Id. at 2732.
119. Id. at 2720.
120. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991). The Haslip Court did
not establish a "bright line" test for determining whether a particular punitive damage award
was constitutional. Id. However, it did emphasize the need for "reasonableness and adequate
guidance from the court" as part of the constitutional recipe whenever punitive damages are
employed. Id.
121. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 113 S.Ct. 2711, 2720 (1993). The
Court cited Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909), as the source of the term
"grossly excessive." Id. at 111. In Waters-Pierce, the Court held that it may only interfere
with a state's police power in determining penalties if such penalties are "so grossly excessive
as to amount to a taking without due process of law." Id.
122. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720. Once again, the Court declined to set a "bright line" test
to determine whether a punitive damage award meets constitutional muster. See Haslip, 499
U.S. 1,18 (1991).
123. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 113 S.Ct. 2711, 2724 (1993).
124. See Barrett, supra note 70, at Al.
125. 114 S.Ct. 2331 (1994).
126. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Court Rules States May Not Bar Judges' Review of
Punitive Damages, WASH. POST, June 25, 1994, at A13.
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test, it did, at least, reaffirm the notion that there are due process limits to
punitive damage awards.' 2 7
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HONDA MOTOR CO. V. OBERG
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg wound its way through the Oregon court
system before it reached the United States Supreme Court on appeal from
a 1993 Oregon Supreme Court decision. 2 The case arose from an injury
sustained by the plaintiff, Oberg, as he was operating a three-wheeled 1985
model Honda ATC 350X all-terrain vehicle (ATV) that was manufactured
and sold by the defendants, Honda Motor Co. 29 Oberg, an experienced
ATV operator, was on his second attempt to drive the ATV up a steep
embankment when the ATV tipped over backwards. 30 The ATV tumbled
to the bottom of the embankment and landed on top of Oberg. 3' Oberg
32
suffered facial fractures, cuts to one of his eyes, and an inner ear injury.
As a consequence of his injuries, Oberg underwent extensive reconstructive
plastic surgery. 33 Oberg testified at trial that he continued to suffer from
double vision, headaches, short-term memory loss, and cognitive impairment. 134
Oberg brought an action against Honda Motor Co., "alleging that
Honda had failed to perform reasonable safety tests on the ATV."'135 As
a consequence, Oberg contended Honda was negligent in selling the ATV
because Honda knew, or should have known, that the ATV was a defective

127. Id. at 2342 (ruling states must comply with Due Process Clause when awarding
punitive damages).
128. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 851 P.2d 1084 (Or. 1993).
129. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 814 P.2d 517, 519 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 814 P.2d 517, 519 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
135. Id.
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product. 3 6 At trial, the jury awarded Oberg $919,390.39 in compensatory
7
damages and $5,000,000.00 in punitive damages.1
Honda appealed the circuit court's judgment against it, arguing that the
jury's punitive damages award was both "unconstitutional and excessive.""'13
Specifically, Honda argued that the punitive damage award
violated its rights under Article I, Section 16 of the Oregon Constitution, ' 9 as the five million dollar fine was, according to Honda, an "excessive fine or a disproportional penalty."'"
Honda also argued that the

punitive damage award constituted a violation of the United States
4
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment.' '

Honda contended that ORS section 30.925142 gave the jury "standa-

136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS is entitled "Special Liability of Seller of Product for

Physical Harm to User or Consumer" and states, in part, that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller
is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
id. (emphasis added).
137. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 814 P.2d 517, 519 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
138. Id. at 521. Honda also argued that the trial court erred in permitting Oberg to read
into evidence several written documents from the Consumer Products Safety Commission.
Id. at 519-21. These documents indicated, inter alia, that ATV vehicles of the type on which
Oberg was injured were known to be prone to rollover-type accidents. Id. at 520. The
implication of these documents was not only that three-wheeled ATV's were prone to the
type of accident which injured Oberg, but that Honda was aware of this danger yet proceeded
to manufacture and market ATV's notwithstanding the risk. Id. at 519-20.
139. OR. CONST. art. I, § 16. Article 1, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution states,
in part, that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed. Cruel and
unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, but all penalties shall be proportional to the
offense." Id.
140. Oberg, 814 P.2d at 521.
141. Id.
142. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1988). Section 30.925 of the Oregon Revised Statutes
provides: "(1) In a products liability action, punitive damages shall not be recoverable unless
it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the party against whom punitive damages
is sought has shown wanton disregard for the health, safety and welfare of others." Id.
Section 30.925 goes on to indicate that a jury shall base its determination as to the amount,
if any, of the punitive damage award upon the following factors:
(a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise from the defendant's
misconduct; (b) The degree of the defendant's awareness of that likelihood; (c) The
profitability of the defendant's misconduct; (d) The duration of the misconduct and
any concealment of it; (e) The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon
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rdless discretion to award punitive damages,"' 43 as that provision of
the statute "contains no requirement that the award be proportional to
plaintiff's injury, no specific guidelines for fixing the amount of the
award, and no maximum,"'" and because it enabled the jury to
consider Honda's net worth. 45 Additionally, Honda argued that the
Oregon Constitution was per se unconstitutional because it denied
Oregon courts the opportunity to review jury verdicts for excessive-

ness.t

46

The Oregon Court of Appeals, relying in part on its analysis of
the Supreme Court's decision in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co v. Haslip147 held that the "jury's discretion was exercised within reasonable
constraints."'' 48 The court acknowledged that Article VII, Section
3, of Oregon's Constitution 49 prohibited courts from setting aside
a damage award even where a fine is excessive. 50 Nonetheless,
the court emphasized that Oregon courts could review punitive
damage awards to determine whether sufficient evidence existed to
support the verdict and whether the jury was instructed in a manner
that closely resembled the instructions upheld in the Supreme Court's
Consequently, the court found a "rational
Haslip decision.'
52
'
relationship"' between the punitive damage award against Honda
and the amount "necessary for deterrence."'' 53 Finally, the court of
appeals concluded that the evidence supported the verdict, and

Id.

The financial condition of the defendant; and (g)
discovery of the misconduct; (f)
The total deterrent effect of other punishment imposed upon the defendant as a
result of the misconduct, including, but not limited to, punitive damage awards to
persons in situations similar to the claimant's and the severity of criminal penalties
to which the defendant has been or may be subjected.

143. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 814 P.2d 517, 522 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. Article VII (amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution states, in part, that
"[iun actions at law, where the value in a controversy shall exceed $200, the right of a trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any
court of this state, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the
verdict." OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (amended).
147. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
148. Oberg, 814 P.2d at 523.
149. OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (amended).
150. Oberg, 814 P.2d at 524.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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therefore affirmed the circuit court decision.'54 Honda then appealed to the Supreme Court of Oregon.' 55
The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the decision of the court
of appeals. 5 6 Honda contended, inter alia, that it was unconstitutional for Oregon to deny its courts the power of post-trial review of
the punitive damages award against Honda. 57 Nonetheless, the
Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were adequate safeguards
in place in Oregon to supplant the lack of judicial review which
assured that "an award of punitive damages in a product liability
action... [bore] a rational relationship to... [Honda's] conduct and
to the need for punishment and deterrence.""' Thus, according to
the Oregon Supreme Court, Honda's Fourteenth Amendment rights
were not violated.' 59 Honda again appealed, this time to the United
States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in order "to consider
154. Id. at 525.
155. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 851 P.2d 1084 (Or. 1993).
156. Id. at 1086. The court noted that Honda's appeal contained several arguments. Id.
First, Honda contended that the trial court erred on several points when it allowed Oberg
to read to the jury portions of the Consumer Products Safety Commission Report on the use
of ATV vehicles. Id. Second, Honda asserted that the trial court erred when it denied
Honda's new trial motion which was based on two eyewitnesses to the accident in which
Oberg was injured. Id. at 1089. Third, Honda argued that the punitive judgment against it
violated its rights under Article 1, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. Id. at 1090. On
this point, the court concluded that article 1, section 16 of the Oregon Constitution was
intended for criminal cases, and therefore, did "not apply to civil awards of punitive
damages." Id. at 1091.
This casenote, however, will focus primarily on Honda's contention that the
judgment against it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, as this is the focus of the United States Supreme Court
decision in this case. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
157. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 851 P.2d 1084, 1091 (Or. 1993).
158. Id. at 1097.
159. Id. at 1099. The Oregon Supreme Court began its analysis with an examination
of the United States Supreme Court decision in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, which
had not yet been decided at the conclusion of the Oberg v. Honda trial. 499 U.S. 1, (1991).
The Oregon Supreme Court noted that the Haslip Court had indicated that
traditionally the "amount of the punitive award is initially determined by the jury instructed
to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar wrongful conduct. The
jury's determination is then reviewed by trial and appellate courts to ensure that it is
reasonable." Id. at 1092 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15).
The Oregon Supreme Court was able to distill what it believed to be the key
constitutional component of the Haslip decision: the finder of fact must be given "adequate
guidance" when making punitive damage awards. Oberg, 851 P.2d at 1094. This guidance
must "[impose] a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of ...
factfinders in awarding punitive damages." Id. (quoting Haslip 499 U.S. at 22).
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395

whether Oregon's limited judicial review of the size of punitive
60
damage awards is consistent with ... [its] decision in Haslip."'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. HONDA, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion and began the Court's
analysis with a review of its recent Haslip and TXO decisions regarding the
size of punitive damage awards. 6 The Court reiterated that while it had
not drawn a "mathematical bright line between the constitutionally
62
acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable,"' there is, nonetheless, a
163
The Court stated64
constitutional limit to the size of punitive damages.
excessive"'
"grossly
be
to
as
large
so
is
that if a punitive damage award
65
violated.
is
then the Due Process Clause
Next, the Court distinguished Honda from other recent punitive
66 While Haslip and TXO, for
damages cases which the Court reviewed.'
example, focused in large part upon the amount of the punitive damage
award, 67 the focus of Honda was "the question of what procedures are
necessary to ensure that punitive damages are not imposed in an arbitrary
manner."' 168 Specifically, the Court indicated, the issue in Honda was
"whether the Due Process Clause requires judicial review of the amount of
punitive damage awards."' 69 The Court noted that it was compelled by its

160. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2334-35 (1994).
161. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2335.
162. Id. (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
163. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (1994).
164. Id. (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 271819 (1993)). The malleability of the phrase "grossly excessive" has troubled some
commentators. See, e.g., supra note 7, at 190.
165. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2335.
166. Id. at 2334-35.
167. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (1994).
168. Id. at 2335.
169. Id. at 2335. The Oregon Constitution does not allow judicial review of punitive
damage awards, "unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the
verdict." OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (amended).
The Court noted that because its opinions in Haslip and TXO had emphasized the
importance of "meaningful and adequate review by the trial court," as well as "subsequent
appellate review," it naturally followed that the Court should compare Oregon's unorthodox
system to traditional procedures. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2335 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991)).
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recent decisions in this area 71 to explore the ramifications of Oregon's
'7
"departure from traditional procedures."' 1
The Court then traced the history of punitive damages, starting with the
eighteenth century English case of Huckle v. Money, 172 and noting that
subsequent English decisions from that era where damages were awarded
consistently allowed for a judicial determination as to whether a new trial
was warranted due to excessive damages.'
The Court made short shrift
of Oberg's interpretation of another English case from this period,
Beardmore v. Carrington.74 The Court stated that while Oberg would
"infer ...[from this case] that 18th-century common law did not provide
for judicial review,"' 75 the case itself contradicts this inference. 76 In
short, one may reasonably infer from the Court's interpretation of the
English history of punitive damages that judicial review of damage awards
is a firmly established English common law procedural mandate. 77
The Court next traced the English practice of judicial review incorporated into United States common law. 178 In the United States, as in
England, judicial review of damage awards was common procedure
notwithstanding the "deference ordinarily afforded jury verdicts. ' 179 In
fact, the Court noted that in the nineteenth century, because of the difficulty
in pinpointing the actual thought processes that lead to jury awards, 8 0 the
170. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 2335 (1994). The Court noted that
its decisions in Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), and TXO, 113 S.Ct. 2711 (1993), had placed
great emphasis upon the procedural component of the Due Process Clause. Honda, 114 S.
Ct. at 2335.
171. Id.
172. 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763). In discussing the origins of punitive
damages, many commentators cite Huckle v. Money and Wilkes v. Woods as companion
cases. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
173. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2336. The Court noted that judicial review of damage awards
was the English practice despite the strong deference that was given to the validity of the
jury's decision. Id.
174. 2 Wils. 244, 95 Eng. Rep 790 (C.P. 1764). The court in Carringtonindicated that
there were no cases in which a court had granted a new trial based on excessive damages.
Honda, 114 S.Ct. at 2336.
175. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 2336 (1994).
176. Id.
177. Id. Justice Stevens pointed out that Oberg's argument lacked substance because
the Carringtoncourt itself had cited a case, Chambers v. Robinson, 2 Str. 691, 93 Eng. Rep.
287 (K.B. 1726), which had, in fact, granted a new trial because of excessive damages.
Honda, 114 S.Ct. at 2336.
178. Id. at 2336-37.
179. Id.
180. See generally JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 85-99 (1988). Guinther
indicates that there have been few studies of jury bias, for example, because of the
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focus of judicial review was upon the amount of the award."' Additionally, the Court observed that nineteenth century treatises182 supported the
notion that a new trial should be granted where damage awards were
excessive.' 83
Finally, the Court pointed out that contemporary practice has sustained
this procedure of judicial review of damage awards4--that is, "the federal
courts and in every State, except Oregon, judges review the size of damage
awards."" 5
Once the Court established the firm roots of judicial review of damage
awards in United States jurisprudence,8 6 it next highlighted the "dramatic
difference"'' 87 between Oregon's scope of review and the bedrock of
traditional review. 88 In summing up Oregon's program of judicial review,
the Court emphasized that there are only three instances in which an Oregon
trial judge or an Oregon appellate court may order a new trial in relation to
a punitive damages award:"8 9 (1) "if the jury was not properly instructed;" '9 (2) "if error occurred during the trial;'' 9' '92 or (3) "if there is no
evidence to support any punitive damages at all."'
The Court did not dispute that the above-mentioned three criteria for
a new trial would provide some limited protection to a defendant faced with
a possible punitive damage judgment. 93 However, the problem is that
Oregon has no procedure for reducing or setting aside punitive damage
awards where "the defendant's only basis for relief is the amount of punitive

subjectivity of the issue. Id. at 93.
181. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2337 (1994).
182. 1 D. GRAHAM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEW TRIALS 442 (2d ed. 1855); T.
SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 469 (1883).

SUTHERLAND,
707 (5th ed. 1869); J.

183. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2337.
184. Id. at 2338.
185. Id. at 2338 (emphasis added). The Court cites, among other cases and sources,
Dagnello v. Long Island, R.R., 289 F.2d 797, 799-800 n.1 (2d Cir. 1961) as a case.citing
cases from nearly all 50 states which subscribe to the procedure of judicial review of damage
awards.
186. Honda, 114 S.Ct. at 2338.
187. Id. In fact,'the Court points out that Oregon is the only state which does not
permit its judges to review the size of damage awards. Id.
188. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 2338 (1994).
189. Id.

190. Id.
191. Id.

192. Id.
193. ld. at 2339. The Court pointed out that Oregon's judicial review ensures that
those defendants whose conduct does not warrant any punitive damages are protected. Id.
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damages the jury award[s]."' 94 The constitutional dilemma, then, is
located in the gaping hole which these three criteria leave, through which
a defendant might be punished in an "arbitrary" manner. 95 Consequently,
"Oregon's abrogation of a well-established common law protection against
arbitrary deprivations of property raises a presumption that its procedures
violate the Due Process Clause."' 96
The Court rejected Oberg's contention that "Oregon judges have the
power to examine the size of the award to determine whether the jury was
influenced by passion or prejudice."' 97 In so doing, the Court noted that

if Oregon courts possessed this power, then certainly the Oregon Supreme

Court would have exercised it in this case.' 9 Likewise, the Court rejected
Oberg's contention that Oregon provides sufficient review in that a trial
judge may overturn a punitive damage award where there is "no substantial
evidence to support an award of punitive damages."' 99 The Court rejected
this argument because it only applied to evidence to support the award of
194. Id. at 2338 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 2338-39. The Court cites Van Lom v. Schneidermann, 210 P.2d 461 (1949),
as the Oregon case which definitively interpreted Oregon's 1910 constitutional amendment
to preclude judicial review of a jury's determination of damage awards where the basis of
that review would rest upon the amount of the award. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S.
Ct. 2331, 2335 (1994).
In Van Lom v. Schneiderman, the plaintiff was "slapped, pushed and kicked," by the
owner of a tavern. 210 P.2d at 462. The jury awarded the plaintiff $5,000 in compensatory
damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. Id. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court stated
that the "court is of the opinion that the verdict of $10,000.00 is excessive," but that "a
majority are of the opinion that this court has no power to disturb the verdict." Id.
The Oregon Supreme Court went on to note that "[i]t may be assumed that the
framers of Art. VII, § 3, [of the Oregon constitution], were not unacquainted with the
construction which the Supreme Court of the United States had theretofore placed upon the
Seventh Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 465. The Oregon framers,
nonetheless, "rejected the common-law exception therein." Id. Thus, the Van Lom court
concluded, the Oregon framers had intended to "eliminate, as an incident of jury trial in this
state, the common-law power of a trial court to re-examine the evidence and set aside a
verdict because it was excessive or in any other respect opposed to the weight of the
evidence." Id.
The Van Lom court expressed its displeasure with the Oregon constitutional
provision, yet manifestly stated that "[w]hatever our individual opinions may be about the
policy involved in Art. VII, § 3, we have no right or authority to subvert its obvious purpose
or to refuse to apply its provisions to the full extent of their evident meaning." Id. at 471.
Finally, the Oregon Supreme Court predicted that "a system of trial by jury in which the
judge is reduced to the status of a mere monitor cannot be expected to survive." Id.
196. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 (1994).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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any punitive damages amount and not the actual amount that was awarded.2°° The Court indicated that the risk under Oregon's system is that a
of an "arbitrary
defendant may be subjected to a punitive damage2 award
2
' 20 ' and would thus be "unjustly punished.,
amount
Oregon's failure to follow tradition, in this instance, led the Court to
conclusion: "Oregon's abrogation of a well-established
inevitable
an
common law protection against arbitrary deprivations of property raises a
presumption that its procedures violate the Due Process Clause." 203 The
Court drove home its point by indicating that in most of its due process
decisions, appellants have consistently argued that even traditional
procedures have lacked significant safeguards to withstand constitutional
scrutiny. 2°4 The inference here is that if in some cases standards which
meet traditional procedural guidelines have been found violative of the
Constitution, any standard which deviates from traditional standards, is even
more likely to offend the Constitution.2 '
Nonetheless, the Court indicated that there have been "deviations from
hav
established procedures ",206 which have not proven unconstitutional.2 7
Oregon's procedures, however, according to the Court's analysis, do not fall
into this narrow group of cases.20 8 In fact, the Court pointed out that
modem society, with its "rise of large, interstate and multinational

200. Id. Thus, the Court found that merely ensuring that punitive damages in some
ephemeral amount were warranted was not sufficient protection against an excessive amount
of punitive damages. Id.
201. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331', 2339 (1994).
202. Id. What Oregon lacked, then, according to the Court, was a means of assuring
that there was "evidence providing at least a rational basis for the particular deprivation of
property imposed by the State to deter future wrongdoing." Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2340.
205. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2340 (1994). The Court stated that
"[w]hen the absent procedures would have provided protection against arbitrary and
inaccurate adjudication, this Court has not hesitated to find the proceedings violative of Due
Process." Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. In fact, the Court states that were it to automatically label each and every
deviation from traditional procedure unconstitutional, it "would be to deny every quality of
the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress and improvement." Id. (quoting
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1984)).
208. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1984). The Court cites Hurtado as an
example of where a deviation from standard procedures was unconstitutional. Honda, 114 S.
Ct at 2340. In Hurtado, 110 U.S. 516 (1984), where a magistrate provided an examination
of criminal defendants that would at common law have been performed by a grand jury, the
protection afforded the defendant satisfied constitutional muster. Id. at 538.
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corporations " 20 9 made the potentiality of biased juries and arbitrary awards
an even more onerous potentiality--a potentiality which necessitates
heightened vigilance of due process rights.21 °
The Court next reasoned that because jury instructions generally
provide juries with great discretion in determining punitive damage
amounts, 211 there is a danger that juries may be influenced by their "biases
against big business, particularly those without strong local presences. ' 21 2
Further, the Court concluded that while Oregon has deviated from traditional
procedures,2 13 it has failed to replace the void with a safeguard that would
be adequate to meet the requirements of due process safeguards.214
Consequently, the Court held that "Oregon's denial of judicial review of the
size of punitive damage awards violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. "215
The Court acknowledged, yet flatly rejected, Oberg's contention that
Oregon had four safeguards which effectively worked to ensure that Honda's
due process rights were not violated.21 6 Namely, Oberg contended that the
cumulative effect of (1) Oregon limiting the damages amount to that
indicated in the complaint; 2 7 (2) the clear and convincing standard of
proof;2 . (3) the pre-verdict limit on the amount of punitive damages; 2 9
209. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538.
210. Id.
211. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2340 (1994).
212. Id. at 2341. Notably, not only does Honda Motor Company lack a significant local
tie to Oregon, it is a Japanese company, which may conceivably play a part in a jury's
decision due to pro-American impulses.
Similar statements could be made about other recent jury awards of punitive
damages. For instance, in relation to the recent action taken against the major law firm of
Baker & McKenzie, some commentators have indicated that the jury was influenced by their
bias against lawyers. Martha Groves, Law Firm's Arrogance Cited in Huge Harassment
Award, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1994, at
1.
213. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct 2331, 2338 (1994). The Court was
particularly concerned that Oregon was the only state which did not allow judicial review of
the size of damage awards. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2341. Significantly, the Court points out that while its holding does make
clear the necessity of judicial review in order to meet due process requirements, it has not
indicated what standard of review is necessary to meet constitutional muster. Id. at 2341
n.10.
216. Id. at 2341.
217. Id. The Court reasoned that this was "hardly a constraint at all," because Oberg
selected as large an award as he wished, and it is "unclear," if an amount selected by the jury
which exceeded this predetermined "maximum" could have been set aside. Id.
218. Id. The Court conceded that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof
is a significant safeguard against unfounded punitive damages. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
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220
joined forces to
and (4) the specific nature of the jury instructions
22
" '
protect Honda's due process rights.
Finally, the Court took issue with Oberg's interpretation of the
historical role of the jury as "final arbiter of the amount of punitive
damages."222 The Court agreed with Oberg that juries, in some instances,
223 The Court saw
have been allowed to judge the law as well as the facts.
a dramatic distinction, however, between cases in which juries made an
"arbitrary decision to acquit" 224 a criminal defendant, and those cases
which resulted in "arbitrary deprivations of [a defendant's] liberty or
property." 2" While the Court stated that the Due Process Clause is not
triggered when a jury arbitrarily acquits a criminal defendant, the same
226 Thus, the
cannot be said with respect to excessive damage awards.
Court concluded that whenever a defendant is faced with the potentiality of
paying a punitive damage award, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause is implicated.227
Justice Stevens concluded his majority opinion by reiterating that the
combination of "common law practice, the procedures applied by every
other state, the strong presumption favoring judicial review ...applied [by
the Court] in other areas of the law, and elementary considerations of
justice, ' 22 8 all indicated that punitive damage awards must be subject to
229 Oregon's procedure that
judicial review to meet due process standards.
denies its courts this power to review damage award amounts, is therefore

114 S. Ct. 2331, 2341 (1994). Nonetheless, the Court found that it would not protect a
defendant (who was arguably deserving of some punitive damage sanction) from being
victimized by a punitive damage award of an "arbitrary amount." Id.
219. Id. Here the Court noted that Oberg had cited no cases to indicate that Oregon
courts have the power to determine, prior to the verdict, the maximum amount of punitive
damages. Likewise, the Court stated that it knew of no court (presumably anywhere) which
engaged in this pre-verdict activity. Id.
220. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2341 (1994). Again, the Court
acknowledged that Oberg was at least correct in his contention that carefully tailored jury
instructions serve as an "important check against excessive awards." However, the Court
reasoned that even the best of jury instructions could not protect Honda should the jury have
decided to ignore the instructions and "return a lawless, biased, or arbitrary verdict." Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2341 (1994).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2341 (1994).
229. Id.
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unconstitutional.23 Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded the
23 1
decision of the Oregon Supreme Court.
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion,232 contended that OregonIs system of awarding punitive damages was adequate to withstand constitutional challenge.2 33 Justice Ginsburg reasoned that "Oregon's procedures
...pass the Constitution's due process threshold" 2' because: (1) Oregon
"guides and limits" the jury's discretion in imposing punitive damages;
(2)
punitive damages are not awarded absent clear and convincing evidence of
defendant's culpability; and (3) Oregon does provide judicial review to the
extent that a verdict may be set aside if there was "reversible error" at trial,
or if there is no evidence to support the verdict.235
Justice Ginsburg relied heavily upon the Court's recent decisions in
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,236 and TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp.,237 in reaching her conclusion that Oregon's procedures
were adequate. 23' First, Justice Ginsburg noted that in both of these recent
decisions, the Court, while noting that due process does impose limits on
damage awards, upheld large punitive damage awards because the awards
had not violated due process. 239 However, she pointed out that neither
decision indicated with specificity what "procedures or substantive criteria
[are] essential to satisfy due process. '
While the Court did not arrive at a "bright line" test in either Haslip or
TXO for determining due process limits where punitive damages are
awarded, Justice Ginsburg indicated that both cases pointed, nonetheless,
toward the same guideline.24 Namely, the cases established the guideline
that "a 'concern [for] reasonableness' is what due process essentially
requires., 2 2
This reasonableness requirement, according to Justice
Ginsburg, helps ensure, but does not guarantee, that punitive damage awards

230. Id.
231. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 851 P.2d 1084 (Or. 1993).
232. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2343 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
233. Id. at 2344.
234. Id. at 2343.
235. Id.
236. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
237. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
238. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2343 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 2343 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
242. Id. (citing Justices' opinion in Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
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will not be "grossly excessive. 243 Justice Ginsburg insisted that Oregon's
procedures meet this reasonableness requirement. 2" Moreover, Justice
its five-million-dollar
Ginsburg noted that Honda failed to establish that
245
excessive.,
"grossly
was
award
punitive damage
Justice Ginsburg also indicated that Oregon had in place pre-verdict
elements which helped to keep the jury from depriving Honda of its due
process rights. 2' First, Oberg's compensatory and punitive damage award
247
Additionally,
was limited by the amount set out in the complaint.
objecting to either of these amounts prior to
from
precluded
Honda was 24not
8
the verdict.
Second, Oberg was prohibited from introducing evidence of Honda's
financial condition prior to submitting "evidence sufficient to justify a prima
facie claim of punitive damages." 249
Third, Justice Ginsburg termed "more significant"' ° that Honda could
if Oberg could establish through
only be compelled to pay punitive '2damages
"clear and convincing evidence 5 1 that Honda had displayed "wanton
2
Moreover,
disregard for the health, safety and welfare of others."'
standard
evidence
convincing
and
clear
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the
is far more stringent than either of the state standards which were applied
in the Haslip and TXO decisions.253
Fourth, Justice Ginsburg indicated what she felt to be the "most
important '25 element of product liability cases: seven substantive criteria
25
which Oregon requires as the basis of punitive damage awards. " These
30.925(3).256
section
Statute,
seven criteria are set out in Oregon Revised
243. Id. (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2720

(1993)).

244. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2343.
245. Id.
dissenting).
246. Id. at 2344 (Ginsburg, J.,
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. (quoting from Or. Rev. Stat. § 41.315(2) (1991)).
250. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2344 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
251. Id. (quoting from OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1991)).
252. Honda, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2344 (quoting from OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1991)).
253. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2344-45 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
254. Id. at 2345.
255. Id.
256. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1993). The seven factors include:
(a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise from the defendant's
misconduct; (b) The degree of the defendant's awareness of that likelihood; (c) The
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For Justice Ginsburg, then, these criteria gave the jury ample
guidance in setting the amount of the punitive damage award.257
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the seven criteria that the
Honda jury considered provide "far more guidance than their
counterparts in Haslip and TXO received."' 8
Justice Ginsburg stated that while Oregon does not offer postverdict review to determine if damages are excessive, the "seven
factors against which Alabama's Supreme Court tests punitive
damages 59 strongly resemble the statutory criteria Oregon's juries
are instructed to apply." 26° Indeed, according to Justice Ginsburg,
Oregon's "procedures are perhaps more likely to prompt rational and
fair punitive decisions than are the post hoc checks employed in
jurisdictions following Alabama's pattern. '26 1 Moreover, Justice
Ginsburg emphasized that the Supreme Court had generally presumed
that juries follow the judge's instructions.262

Id.

profitability of the defendant's misconduct; (d) The duration of the misconduct and
any concealment of it; (e) The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon
discovery of the misconduct; (f) The financial condition of the defendant; and (g)
The total deterrent effect of other punishment imposed upon the defendant as a
result of the misconduct, including, but not limited to, punitive damage awards to
persons in situations similar to the claimant's and the severity of the criminal
penalties to which the defendant has been or may be subjected.

257. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2345 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
258. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2345.
259. Id. at 2346. The Alabama factors are:
"(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award
and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that
actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,
the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the
existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the
defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and
of having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the 'financial position' of the
defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on
the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the existence
of other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be
taken in mitigation."
Id.
260. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2346 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 2346 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
2419 (1994)).
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Concluding her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg reiterated
that Oregon's procedures give sufficient guidance to the juries in
setting punitive awards to ensure that defendants' due process rights
are not violated.263 Justice Ginsburg further concluded that because
the verdict was not "so 'grossly excessive' as to violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, ' ,264 the Honda Majority
had no reason to condemn Oregon's procedures as violative of due
process.265
B. THE MERIT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DAMAGE AWARDS

The Court's decision in Honda is worthy of praise for a fundamental
reason: the Court once again resisted the impulse to set out a "bright line"
test for determining when a punitive damage award violates due process.26 By failing to develop a "bright line" test, the Court has wisely
acknowledged that in effectuating the goals of punitive damages, 267 there
are simply too many variables to limit such awards to anything approximating mathematical precision. 268 The Court's Honda decision has enabled
these variables to be left primarily, though not exclusively, to the jury's
discretion.
By merely having acknowledged the constitutionality of punitive
damages, 269 the Court should in no way be obligated to set out a type of
algebraic scale by which such damages should be computed.270 Indeed,
it is because bright line tests are easy in the sense that they are mechanical
263. Honda, 114 S.Ct. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 2350 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S.Ct.
2711, 2720 (1991)).
265. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2350.
266. Id. at 2341. Nonetheless, the Court set out clear ground rules which must be
followed to satisfy constitutional muster. Id. In its review of Oregon's procedures, the Court
stressed the importance of "common law practice, the procedures of every other State, the
strong presumption favoring judicial review ... [it] applied in other areas of the law, and
elementary considerations of justice....." Id.
267. See KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, § 2.1, at 23-24 (1980) (stating
that the goals of punitive damages are punishment and deterrence).
268. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (indicating that the
Court cannot take into account all the variables that might occur in a given case).
269. Blatt et al., supra note 75, at 16-52 (articulating that the Court has focused on the
constitutionality of punitive damages for nearly 10 years).
270. Guy 0. Kornblum & William A. Cerillo, Punitive Damages are Alive and Well
After Haslip, But is There No Hope. 60 DEF. COUNS. J.29, 38 (1993) (indicating that the
Court seems to have deliberately left much of the punitive damage award formula to the
discretion of juries and judges in order to encourage "diversity and active debate" of this
sensitive issue).
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and formulaic that such tests are seductive. Nonetheless, given the
complexities upon which each case involving punitive damages turns, it was,
necessary for the Court to steadfastly resist any impulse to give guidelines
where none are needed.
Much to its credit, the Court in Honda has cautioned that there are
indeed limits to punitive damage awards, which if exceeded, must be struck
down.27 ' In so doing, the Court has walked a fine line wherein it has
conceded the constitutionality of punitive damages but has left ample room
to protect against awards linked, for example, to jury prejudice toward a
given defendant.27 2 Thus foreign and deep pocket defendants 273 can take
some comfort in knowing that while they may be severely stung by a
punitive damage award, the Court has shown a genuine interest in protecting
them against unconstitutional damage awards.27
Additionally, it is important to remember that the Court's decision in
Honda does not indicate that the five-million-dollar punitive damage award
against Honda Motor Co. was so excessive as to violate Honda's due
process rights.275 On the contrary, the decision merely suggests that the
Constitution vests Oregon's courts with the power to review the jury's
decision.276 In fact, on remand, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that
the five-million-dollar award was "within the range that a rational juror
would be entitled to award in light of the record as a whole ....,,277
In fact, the importance of Honda is not that the Court has indicated that
the five-million-dollar award may have violated Honda's constitutional
rights. Indeed, the Court has said no such thing. Instead, the Court has
held that the traditional safeguard of judicial review is important enough as
a vehicle for protecting constitutional rights that it is not a procedural option
from which states may choose.278 Instead, it is a vital constitutional
prerequisite that must be followed whenever punitive damages are involved.
In so holding, the Court wisely declined to further narrow the jury's part in
271. Id. at 2335.
272. Id. at 2341-42. See also Lahr, supra note 13, at 405 (pointing out the fear that
"corporate communities" and industrial nations have of jury prejudice whenever punitive
damages are involved).
273. Id.
274. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (1994).
275. Id. at 2342. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme Court
for a determination of the constitutionality of the judgment against Honda. Id.
276. Id.
277. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 888 P.2d 8, 11 (Or. 1995).
278. Id. at 2342. The Court stated that a "decision to punish a tortfeasor by means of
an exaction of exemplary damages is an exercise of state power that must comply with the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
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the punitive damage equation by thrusting upon courts an artificial "bright
line" test.279

C. THE UNCERTAIN REVERBERATIONS OF HONDA

Oregon may have been the only state to deny its courts the power to
review damage awards at the time of the Honda decision, 28 but that does
not mean that other states will be untouched by the decision. Weighed
together, the Haslip, TXO, and Honda decisions do not necessarily indicate
ihat the Court is poised to set out a "bright line" test for determining the
constitutional limit to punitive damage awards' However, these decisions
certainly give fair warning that the Court is, at least, moderately annoyed.
This annoyance stems from punitive damage awards that have alternately
been described282as "monstrous heresy, ' 281 and an "unsightly and unhealthy
excrescence.,"
With this in mind, states can now be certain that not only will punitive
damage awards be subject to substantive limits, but that these awards must
also meet due process procedural standards. 2 3 The Court's Honda
decision did not deliver a "bright line" test for determining with precision
what these standards are; however, the Court did shed some light on those
factors which it considers of particular constitutional importance. 28
Arguably, the Court's Honda decision, with its emphasis on the
importance of judicial review of damage awards, may indicate that the Court
has grown intolerant of punitive damage awards that commonly stretch well
into the millions of dollars.285 It seems more likely, however, that the
Court has not grown intolerant of such awards so much as it has grown
increasingly concerned that such large awards exceed constitutional
boundaries.2 86 By focusing in Honda on judicial review of jury ver279. Id. at 2341.
280. Id. at 2338. In fact, the Court went on to state that "Oregon's abrogation of a wellestablished common law protection ... raises a presumption that its procedures violate the
Due Process Clause." Id. at 2339.
281. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872).
282. Id.
283. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2341 (1994). Moreover, the Honda
Court noted that, historically, it has not hesitated to find procedural violations of Due Process
when "absent procedures" would have protected defendants against "arbitrary and inaccurate
adjudication." Id. at 2340.
284. See supra text accompanying note 241.
285. See David G. Savage, Court to Review Issue of Large Punitive Damages Law, N.
Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1994, at A24 (stating that at the time the Court agreed to review the
Honda decision, several members of the court were ready to rein in punitive damages).
286. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2334 (1994). The Court in Honda
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the Court is both acknowledging the value and the limits of juries
when punitive damages are awarded.288 Until recently, the means by
289
which juries reach their damage awards have escaped close scrutiny.
After Honda, however, in which the importance of judicial review was
strongly emphasized, 29 the jury decision making processes will likely
receive greater attention. Thus, in Honda, the role of the jury in punitive
damage awards seems secure, but the traditional role of the judge in
reviewing the damages awarded by juries is equally secure. Working
together, the jury and the judge can best ensure that punitive damages are
not awarded in such a manner as to violate a defendant's constitutional
rights.
dicts,287

V. CONCLUSION
While the Court has not articulated a "bright line" test for determining
when a punitive damages award violates due process, recent cases have
helped to pull in the reins on punitive damages awards gone seemingly out
of control. The Court's decision in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg has further
helped courts to not only ensure that punitive damage awards do not violate
due process, but also that these awards serve the punitive and deterrent
purposes for which they were originally intended.
The Honda decision is not a cure-all for the nation's punitive damages
woes, anymore than were Haslip or TXO. However, the decision is
significant in that it is one more step forward in the Court's efforts-protracted as these steps may be--to place meaningful constraints on the
ability of courts to enforce punitive damages awards.
Although at the time of the Court's decision in Honda, Oregon was the
only state which did not permit judicial review of punitive damage amounts
to determine if the amounts were so excessive as to be unconstitutional,
other states will certainly be affected by this decision. In fact, states are
acknowledged that much of its recent punitive damages decisions focused upon the
substantive limits which the Constitution places upon such awards. Id.
287. Id. at 2335.

288. Id. at 2336-37. The Court pointed out that common law courts in the United States
have historically given great deference to jury verdicts. Id. Nonetheless, these courts also
"recognized that juries sometimes awarded damages so high as to require correction." Id.
289. See Edith Greene, Is the Jury Competent? On Juries and Damage Awards: The
Process of Decision making, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 225, 226
(contending that the reason for this lack of attention to the jury is that judges have given
juries wide latitude and little guidance).
290. Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991). The Court noted that at
common law, the jury determines the amount of the punitive award. Id. The jury's decision
is then "reviewed by trial and appellate courts to ensure that it is reasonable." Id.
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now on notice that they can either modify their own procedures to more
closely approximate those procedures deemed adequate in Haslip and TXO,
or risk being compelled to do so by the United States Supreme Court.
JEFF DUNCAN BRECHT

